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PRISON PRIVATIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
"GOOD FAITH" DEFENSE FOR PRIVATE-PARTY
DEFENDANTS TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ACTIONS
Mark N. Ohrenberger*
INTRODUCTION
States seeking to cut costs in their budgets frequently turn to privatization as a
more economical alternative to directly executing governmental objectives.' The
underlying theory is that private corporations are often able to provide services more
efficiently than the government.2 One particular area where states are relying
increasingly on public/private cooperation is correctional services.3 Part of this
increase in dependence on private prison firms may be the result of an explosion in
prison populations, and the resultant overcrowding of state prison facilities.4 There
has been a particularly sharp rise in the degree to which states contract prison
management to private companies over the past decade and a half.5 As a result,
* Mark Ohrenberger is a JD candidate at the College of William & Mary School of Law.
He graduated from Harding University with a bachelor of arts in political science. He would
like to thank Professor Kathryn Urbonya and Dr. Tom Howard. He also wishes to thank
Kevin, Karen, and Kelli Ohrenberger for their unwavering love and support.
' See Van R. Johnston, Privatization of Prisons: Management, Productivity, and
Governance Concerns, 14 PUB. PRODUCTIVITY & MGMT. REV. 189, 189-90 (1990).
2 See id. For example, one author noted that under a contract with the United States Mar-
shall Service, the private prison management firm, the Corrections Corporation of America,
was able to construct a prison for the federal government for thirty percent less than the cost
of the average public prison. See Scott Vath, Prison Privatization Proves a Profitable Tool
for Locking Up Prisoners, AM. CrrY & COuNTY, Mar. 1993, at 32D.
An additional factor that makes the privatization of corrections of particular interest for
states is that "prisoner litigation constitutes a large percentage of the civil rights litigation in
district courts . . . [and] contracting prison management to private firms will relieve the
government of the burden of defending the multitude of individual and class-wide civil rights
actions." Susan L. Kay, The Implications of Prison Privatization on the Conduct of Prisoner
Litigation Under 42 U.S. C. Section 1983, 40 VAND. L. REv. 867, 868 (1987).
3 Johnston, supra note 1, at 199.
4 See Kerry L. Pyle, Note, Prison Employment: A Long-Term Solution to the Over-
crowding Crisis, 77 B.U. L. REV. 151, 152 (1997) (noting that the prison population tripled
between 1980 and 1995, thus forcing states to seek alternative solutions for housing inmates).
5 See Oliver Barber, Recent Decision, Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997),
71 TEMP. L. REV. 417, 417-18 (1998) ("This has added a new element to governments'
criminal justice policies in the last decade: private companies vying to build, manage, and,
in most cases, profit from prisons.").
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private prison management has become a formidable industry.6
One reason states may choose privatization of correctional facilities over other
available alternatives is that "private corrections concerns offer states an attractive
cost savings of ten to twenty percent over state-run prisons."7 Regardless of why
states are investing substantially more money in prison privatization, this trend in
increased private control over correctional functions has caused the emergence of
two important legal questions: 1) will private parties involved in the provision of
correctional services be subject to liability for deprivations of constitutional rights
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,8 and if so, 2) what defenses will be available to private
prison official defendants as compared to their governmental counterparts? The first
of these questions has been answered clearly in the affirmative.9 The second ques-
tion, however, has yet to be fully resolved.
In Richardson v. McKnight,'° the Supreme Court held that private prison offi-
cials are not entitled to the protection of qualified immunity when faced with the
potential for § 1983 liability despite the fact that public prison officials would be
entitled to this immunity." The holding in Richardson, however, left open the
possibility that private prison officials may be able to assert a "good faith" defense. 2
It is this denial of qualified immunity to private prison officials in § 1983 actions
that makes the question of a good faith defense for those officials working in the
private sector such an important issue. If the trend of prison privatization continues,
it is essential that the position of private prison officials within the scheme of § 1983
litigation be clearly defined.
This Note explores the need for and implications of formal recognition by the
Supreme Court of the existence of a good faith defense for private prison official
defendants in § 1983 actions. This Note also explores the possible contours of such
a defense and provides a comparison between this defense and the qualified
immunity from suit enjoyed by public prison officials. This Note concludes with
recommendations for how the Court might define a good faith defense, and thus
6 See id. at 418. As of 1998, there existed "twenty-one companies [that] generate[d]
more than $250 million in annual revenues, and manage[d] eighty-eight prisons under
government contracts." Id.
7 Id. at 417.
8 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
9 See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 403, 413 (1997) (confirming the pro-
position that private defendants may be liable in § 1983 actions, and permitting such an
action to go forward against correctional officers employed by a private prison facility).
'0 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
" Id. at 412 (stating that because "private actors are not automatically immune (i.e.,
§ 1983 immunity does not automatically follow § 1983 liability) .... private prison guards,
unlike those who work directly for the government, do not enjoy immunity from suit in a
§ 1983 case").
12 Id. at 413-14. How exactly the Court might define a good faith defense, and how such
a defense might function is discussed at length in the subsequent portions of this Note. See
infra Parts III-IV.
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clarify a significant question in modem § 1983 jurisprudence.
Before addressing the possibilities for a good faith defense, this Note presents
a description and analysis of § 1983 jurisprudence, particularly with respect to
prison privatization, from both a historical and modem perspective. This discussion
frames the proper context for an evaluation of the possibilities the concept of a good
faith defense presents. After establishing a foundation in the prison privatization
trend as it relates to § 1983 jurisprudence, an exploration of the need for, implica-
tions of, and possible contours of a good faith defense follows.
I. SECTION 1983 JURISPRUDENCE LEADING TO THE
NEED FOR A GOOD FArI DEFENSE
Before discussing the affirmative defenses available to public and private prison
official defendants, it is necessary to discuss the development of the liability such
defenses are designed to circumvent. In 1871, Congress enacted what would
ultimately be codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, enabling private citizens to bring actions
in federal court against individuals acting "under color of' state law for violations
of constitutional rights.13
Lori DaCosse concisely describes what a successful § 1983 plaintiff must prove:
In order to state a valid § 1983 claim to impose personal
liability, a potential plaintiff must establish the following: (1) the
action at issue was committed under color of law, (2) a person
acting under the badge of state authority perpetrated the action,
and (3) a causal link between the actions and a deprivation of
constitutionally or federally protected rights.
14
13 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress ....
Id. Section 1983 was originally part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871. "Its purpose
[was] plain from the title of the legislation, 'An Act to enforce the Provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes."'
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 171 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978). More recently, the Court has stated that the "purpose of § 1983 [is] to deter
state actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally
guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails." Wyatt v. Cole, 504
U.S. 158, 161 (1992).
14 Lori DaCosse, Note, Richardson v. McKnight: Barring Qualified Immunity from 42
U.S.C. § 1983for Private Jailers, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 149, 151 (1998).
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A. Private Prison Officials as "State Actors" Under § 1983 Analysis
Prison officials are classic examples of individuals who might be exposed to
§ 1983 liability for violating a citizen's constitutional rights while acting "under
color of' law. 5 While on the surface it may appear that this statute extends liability
primarily to officers and employees of the state, private actors are also routinely ex-
posed to liability under § 1983 when acting in concert with state officials.' 6 "[S]tate
action may be found if, though only if, there is such a 'close nexus between the State
and the challenged action' that seemingly private behavior 'may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself."" 7 As an obvious extension of this rule, private prison
officials have thus been held subject to suit in § 1983 actions as "state actors.""8
"5 See, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978) (allowing a state inmate to
proceed in a § 1983 action against prison officials for failing or refusing to send his outgoing
mail).
16 See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,941 (1982) ("[W]e have consis-
tently held that a private party's joint participation with state officials in the seizure of
disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a 'state actor' for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment."). In Lugar, the Court held that a private creditor invoking a state
attachment statute could be liable for Fourteenth Amendment deprivations of property
without due process as a "state actor" in a § 1983 action. The Court explained that "[t]o act
'under color' of law does not require that the accused be an officer of the State. It is enough
that he is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents." Id. (quoting
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)).
" Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001)
(quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)) (finding state action
on the part of a private athletic association in promulgating rules governing recruitment of
athletes to association member schools, and thus permitting the § 1983 suit against a private
defendant); see also West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (finding state action sufficient to
support a § 1983 action on the part of a private physician who provided medical services to
inmates housed in North Carolina state prisons pursuant to a government contract). One
author used the decision in West to explain that "[b]ecause private prisons serve the same
function as public prisons, they qualify as 'state actors' and thus are subject to the same
panoply of constitutional restrictions." Robert G. Schaffer, Note, The Public Interest in
Private Party Immunity: Extending Qualified Immunity from 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to Private
Prisons, 45 DuKE L.J. 1049, 1051 (1996).
"8 See generally Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (permitting a § 1983
action to proceed against private prison guards accused of injuring an inmate by utilizing
excessively tight restraints). Furthering the argument that private prison officials act under
color of law, a number of states have adopted statutes expressly permitting private companies
to provide state correctional services on a contract basis with the state. See, e.g., TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 41-24-101 to 41-24-117 (2003); see also Pyle, supra note 4, at 166-68 & nn.
125-44 (discussing the passage of state statutes authorizing private prison operation to
alleviate state prison overcrowding and to provide employment for inmates).
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B. Recognition of Qualified Immunity for Public Prison Officials
While addressing the question of whether the passage of § 1983 abrogated the
common law tradition of legislative immunity from suit, the Supreme Court, in
Tenney v. Brandhove, 9 ruled that Congress did not intend to abrogate common law
immunities in passing § 1983.20 This reasoning was reaffirmed in Imbler v.
Pachtman,2" in which the Court addressed the issue of prosecutorial immunity.
22 As
this theory of immunities has developed, the Court has held with regard to specific
immunities that it "infer[s] from legislative silence that Congress did not intend to
abrogate such immunities when it imposed liability for actions taken under color of
state law. ' 23 Further, the Court has found that "Iflor executive officials in general...
qualified immunity represents the norm.,
24
Specifically, qualified immunity was first extended to public prison officials in
21
Procunier v. Navarette. In Procunier, a state prisoner brought a § 1983 action
against officials of the state prison where he was housed for the officials' "wrongful
interference with [his] outgoing mail."2'6 The Procunier Court allowed the defendant
prison guards to prevail on a qualified immunity defense because the prisoner's
constitutional rights in his mail were not clearly established at the time of the
underlying facts of the case. 27 Despite the Court's dedication to upholding common
law immunities for public officials in § 1983 actions, it has been largely unwilling
to extend such immunities to private parties that become the subjects of § 1983
litigation.18
C. Denial of Qualified Immunity for Private Prison Officials
Due to the trend of increasing privatization of government services and the
extension of § 1983 liability to the private actors performing these services, the
'9 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
20 Id. at 376 ("We cannot believe that Congress - itself a staunch advocate of legislative
freedom - would impinge on a tradition so well grounded in history and reason by covert
inclusion in the general language before us.").
21 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
22 Id. at 424 (acknowledging the existence of prosecutorial immunity as an extension of
the common law immunity doctrine).
23 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 164 (1992) (refusing to extend qualified immunity to a
private defendant who violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights by executing a writ of
replevin pursuant to an unconstitutional state law).
24 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 (1982).
25 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
26 Id. at 557.
27 Id. at 565.
28 See infra Part I.C (discussing the availability of qualified immunity to private-party
§ 1983 defendants).
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logical question arose of which defenses might be available to these defendants.
Specifically, could private defendants invoke qualified immunity in § 1983 actions?
The line of cases leading to the ultimate determination in Richardson v.
McKnight that private prison officials are not entitled to a qualified immunity
defense 29 began with the Supreme Court's decision in Wyatt v. Cole.3" Wyatt, a
former member of a cattle partnership, brought a § 1983 action against the other
partner, Cole, for the deprivation of property rights in the partnership assets. 3' As
the result of a dispute among the parties following the dissolution of their
partnership, Cole obtained a writ of replevin to seize twenty-four head of cattle.32
The state replevin statute was subsequently declared unconstitutional, and the seized
property ordered to be returned to Wyatt.33 Cole refused to return the seized
property, and Wyatt instituted the lawsuit.
34
Prior to Wyatt, the U.S. circuit courts of appeals were divided over which
defenses were available to private-party § 1983 defendants.35 To determine whether
Cole was entitled to qualified immunity, the Supreme Court began its analysis by
inquiring as to whether an immunity would have existed at common law for a
similar action in tort.6 Because this case involved the alleged misuse of the
Mississippi replevin statute, the Court considered "malicious prosecution and abuse
of process" as the "most closely analogous torts," and determined that private
defendants did not receive immunity from such actions at common law.37 In
response to the defendant's arguments that he would have had a defense at common
law for acting without malice and in good faith, the Court carefully distinguished
a standard defense, requiring a decision as to the defendant's good faith or lack of
29 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997).
30 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
31 Id. at 159-60.
32 Id. at 160.
33 Id.
34 Id.
31 Id. at 161. The Supreme Court "granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the
Courts of Appeals over whether private defendants threatened with 42 U.S.C. § 1983 liability
are, like certain government officials, entitled to qualified immunity from suit." Id. (citation
omitted). The Court went on to cite to various appellate court decisions, and noted that the
Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits had permitted private defendants to exert qualified
immunity, while the First and Ninth Circuits had refused to extend qualified immunity to
private parties. Id. The Court also noted the compromise decision reached by the Sixth
Circuit, prohibiting qualified immunity, but permitting a good faith defense. Id. (citing
Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988)). Duncan is instructive in predicting what
might constitute a good faith defense to be recognized by the Supreme Court and is discussed
infra Part II.A.
36 Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 164.
17 Id. at 164-65.
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malice, from an immunity.
3
The Court continued its qualified immunity analysis by considering the policy
underlying the existence of qualified immunity.39 In the end, it decided that the
interests of private parties "are not sufficiently similar to the traditional purposes of
qualified immunity to justify such an expansion [of the qualified immunity
doctrine] .' 40 Despite the Court's determination of the qualified immunity issue in
Wyatt, the Court concluded with two significant qualifying remarks. First, the Court
narrowed its holding to encompass only those "private persons[] who conspire with
state officials to violate constitutional rights."'" Second, and most importantly, the
Court left open the possibility that private defendants to § 1983 actions are entitled
to a good faith defense.42
It was against the backdrop of the Wyatt opinion that the Court addressed the
specific question of the availability of qualified immunity for private prison officials
in Richardson v. McKnight.43 The plaintiff in Richardson was an inmate at a
privately owned correctional facility." When guards injured the plaintiff by placing
"extremely tight physical restraints" on him, the inmate brought a § 1983 action
against the guards who caused his injuries.45 Although employed by a private prison
management firm, rather than by the State of Tennessee, the guards advanced the
affirmative defense of qualified immunity.46 The availability of the qualified
38 Id. at 165. This is a subtle, yet important distinction to make. The Court in Mitchell v.
Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), noted that "[ulnless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of
violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to
dismissal before the commencement of discovery." Id. at 526 (emphasis added). The possi-
bility of dismissing lawsuits at this early stage in the litigation process makes qualified
immunity an exceptionally potent defense.
39 Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167-68 ("In short, the qualified immunity recognized in Harlow
acts to safeguard government, and thereby to protect the public at large, not to benefit its
agents.").
40 Id. at 168.
" Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Wyatt (No. 91-126)).
42 Id. at 169. This qualification on the Wyatt holding will be discussed at length in the
following sections of this Note, and has the potential for drastically altering § 1983 litigation
where private parties are involved. See infra Parts II-III.
43 521 U.S. 399 (1997). One commentator noted that through its analysis of immunity
with respect to private prison guards, the Court did little more than "ask[] questions already
answered by the Court." Greg E. Harris, Case Comment, Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S.
Ct. 2100 (1997), 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 341, 346 (1998). Other authors noted that there was
more reason to debate the possibilities of qualified immunity for private prison officials
"because a private prison guard serves almost exactly the same function as a governmental
prison guard." David J. DelFiandra, Comment, The Growth of Prison Privatization and the
Threat Posed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 DuQ. L. REV. 591, 610 (2000).
4 Richardson, 521 U.S. at 401.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 402.
1041
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immunity defense to the privately employed prison guards became the issue the
Court took for determination.47 Ultimately, the Court decided that the private prison
officials were not entitled to qualified immunity. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court relied heavily on its decision in Wyatt.49 The Richardson Court took as
instructive the Wyatt Court's method for deciding when qualified immunity is
applicable to private defendants faced with § 1983 liability: "look both to history
and to the purposes that underlie government employee immunity in order to find
the answer."50 The Court ruled that history did not support the extension of quali-
fied immunity to employees of private companies performing correctional functions
on a contract basis with the government." Likewise, the Court found that the
purposes for which state employees are endowed with qualified immunity do not
translate for their private counterparts in the context of employees of private com-
panies that compete for government contracts." The Court concluded its opinion,
however, with three caveats, each of which left unanswered questions with regard
to § 1983 liability for private defendants.5 3
The first of these caveats was that the decision did not address whether the
private defendants, under the facts before the Court, could even be liable for
damages under § 1983. s  Next, the Court narrowed its holding to the facts before
it: defendants from a private, for-profit company, competing with similar com-
panies, for government contracts to perform major government tasks, with limited
direct governmental supervision. 5 Finally, the Court's third caveat recounted the
possibility it had left open in Wyatt: that private defendants in § 1983 actions might
have available to them a good faith defense.56 As it had done in Wyatt, however, the
Court again declined to rule on this defense because the specific issue was not pro-
perly before it.57 This possibility of a good faith defense could become incredibly
" Id. at 401 ('The issue before us is whether prison guards who are employees of a
private prison management firm are entitled to a qualified immunity from suit by prisoners
charging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.").
48 Id.
41 Id. at 402.
5 Id. at 404 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
5' Id. at 404-07. But see id. at 414-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that history does
support the extension of qualified immunity to the private defendants in question, and that
function, rather than status as a state or private employee, should be determinative with
regard to the qualified immunity analysis).
52 Id. at 407-12.
5 See id. at 413-14.
14 Id. at 413.
" Id. (distinguishing these defendants from private individuals having brief associations
with governmental entities, and serving an essentially governmental function or acting with
close government supervision).
56 Id. at 413-14.
57 Id.
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important to private defendants in § 1983 litigation in the post-Richardson era.
The denial of qualified immunity to private correctional officer defendants is
particularly significant given the potency of modem qualified immunity. In Harlow
v. Fitzgerald,8 the Supreme Court redefined the qualified immunity standard by
eliminating the previously required subjective component of the qualified immunity
analysis. 59 Qualified immunity, as redefined under Harlow, made this particular
defense a powerful tool for public officials in defending against § 1983 actions. The
Harlow Court explained:
Reliance on the objective reasonableness of an official's
conduct, as measured by reference to clearly established law,
should avoid excessive disruption of government and permit the
resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment.
On summary judgment, the judge appropriately may determine,
not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was
clearly established at the time an action occurred. If the law at
that time was not clearly established, an official could not
reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal deve-
lopments, nor could he fairly be said to "know" that the law
forbade conduct not previously identified as unlawful. Until this
threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not
be allowed. 6°
As a result of the Court's denial of this defense to private prison officials in
Richardson,6' an exploration of alternative and potentially comparable defenses
available to such parties is imperative.
58 457 U.S. 800 (1981).
51 Compare Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 ("We therefore hold that government officials
performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known."), and id. at 819 ("But again, the defense
would turn primarily on objective factors."), with Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322
(1975) (including a subjective, as well as an objective, component as part of the qualified
immunity analysis). The Court in Wood explained:
[A] school board member is not immune from liability for damages
under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the
action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate
the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took the action
with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional
rights or other injury to the student.
Id.
60 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
6' See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text.
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II. EXPLORING A GOOD FAITH DEFENSE: AVAILABILITY AND APPLICATION OF A
GOOD FAITH DEFENSE BEFORE AND AFTER RICHARDSON
Although when the Court decided Richardson the affirmative defense of good
faith for private § 1983 defendants had not been clearly established or defined, a few
courts had already allowed private defendants to prevail on some version of this
defense.62 Challenged to determine exactly how this defense might function,
modem courts may gain some insight from the earlier cases. However, given the
modem trend toward increased prison privatization, and after the definitive
statement in Richardson that private prison officials may not avail themselves of a
qualified immunity defense, the evolution of the good faith defense has become
particularly important for this category of § 1983 jurisprudence. This Part will
address how different courts handled the good faith defense before Richardson and
how lower courts have handled this defense since Richardson. The trends discussed
in this Part will serve as a basis for suggestions to be offered in Part l11 as to how the
Supreme Court might settle the issues relating to the good faith defense for private
§ 1983 defendants.
A. Good Faith Defense Before Richardson
In its denial of qualified immunity to private § 1983 defendants in Wyatt, the
Court evaluated the various approaches used by the circuit courts of appeals.63 At
that time, the Sixth Circuit had already begun to experiment with a defense of good
faith for private § 1983 defendants. 64
In Duncan v. Peck, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was faced
with a situation that was, in many ways, similar to the factual scenario the Supreme
Court would later address in Wyatt. 61 In a contract suit, the plaintiff obtained a
prejudgment attachment order for stock owned by the defendant, and after the entry
of a default judgment against the defendant, purchased the stock at a sheriff's sale.'
The state attachment statute was subsequently declared unconstitutional, and the
defendant in the original matter brought a § 1983 action against the plaintiff, a
private party, for the deprivation of his property interest in the stock.67
After deciding qualified immunity was not available for the private defendant
because the extension of such immunity was not supported by the history and policy
62 See infra Part H.A.
63 504 U.S. at 161.
' See generally Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988); see also Wyatt, 504 U.S.
at 161.
65 See Duncan, 844 F.2d at 1262-63; see also supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
66 Duncan, 844 F.2d at 1262.
67 id. at 1262-63.
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behind the qualified immunity defense,68 the court turned instead to examine a
similar defense of good faith. 69 The Duncan court distinguished the good faith
defense from qualified or good faith immunity, where lawsuits are commonly
dismissed even before discovery, by explaining that "[a] good faith defense ... is
likely to be based in large part on the facts of the case, with the suit only being
dismissed after trial, or on summary judgment if the defendant can show that there
is no material dispute as to the facts."7 The court further distinguished the two
defenses by explaining that "good faith immunity is based on an objective analysis,
while a good faith defense includes subjective factors."'"
To decide whether the defendant in Duncan was entitled to a defense of good
faith, and at what stage in the litigation process this defense might cause the suit to
be dismissed, the court turned for guidance to the good faith defense available at
common law to defendants in "a suit for malicious prosecution or wrongful attach-
ment.' 7 2 In such cases, if the plaintiff could not produce evidence that the defendant
had acted maliciously and without probable cause, the defendant would prevail on
the affirmative defense of good faith.73 A defendant would also be protected by the
defense where he had relied in good faith on the advice of his attorney.74 As the
court found that there was no dispute of material fact, and the defendant had relied
in good faith on the advice of his attorney, the court was willing to dismiss the case
at the summary judgment phase.75
Although Duncan addressed the good faith defense with regard to private defen-
dants invoking attachment statutes, rather than employees of private firms executing
government functions, the Duncan opinion may be instructive for courts grappling
68 Id. at 1263-64. History and policy were also the reasons later relied upon by the Wyatt
Court in barring the extension of qualified immunity to a private defendant. See supra notes
36-40 and accompanying text.
69 See Duncan, 844 F.2d at 1266 ("We believe that the courts who endorsed the concept
of good faith immunity for private individuals improperly confused good faith immunity with
a good faith defense.").
70 Id.
71 Id. (emphasis added). It should be noted, however, that while the analysis of the
common law defense of good faith or probable cause includes a subjective component, Chief
Justice Rehnquist has suggested that an analysis of this defense may alternatively be resolved
on the basis of an objective inquiry. See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 177 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
The Chief Justice observed that "[r]espondents presumably will be required to show the
traditional elements of a good-faith defense - either that they acted without malice or that
they acted with probable cause." Id. (noting that a party claiming the good faith defense
could prevail by demonstrating they met one of the two components: the subjective com-
ponent, action without malice, or the objective component, action with probable cause).
72 Duncan, 844 F.2d at 1267.
73 Id.
14 Id. at 1267-68.
" Id. at 1268.
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to define the nebulous good faith defense to § 1983 liability. The clear lesson from
Duncan was to look to the related common law causes of action and defenses. 6
The Duncan opinion is significant in another way as well. As discussed above,
the opinion made clear the distinction between the good faith defense and good faith
or qualified immunity.77 A number of courts have confused these two affirmative
defenses.7" Such confusion, however, is unsurprising because qualified immunity,
much like the modem good faith defense to § 1983 actions, finds its origin in the
earlier common law defenses of good faith and probable cause. 9 Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Wyatt noted, "It]he good-faith and probable-cause defense evolved
into our modem qualified-immunity doctrine." 80 Confusing these propositions could
be a huge impediment to the development of the good faith defense.
B. Good Faith Defense After Richardson
The Richardson decision marked a turning point for § 1983 jurisprudence as it
relates to prison privatization. Richardson made it unmistakably clear that em-
ployees of private prison firms would be unable to avail themselves of a qualified
immunity defense when confronted with a § 1983 action despite the availability of
this powerful defense for their counterparts employed by the state.8 The Richardson
Court's decision, however, to leave open the possibility of a similar good faith
defense could have a tremendous impact on the future of prison privatization. 2
76 See id. at 1264, 1267.
71 See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
78 Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Wyatt, noted that as far back as the Court's
ruling in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (holding that the common law availability of
a defense of good faith and probable cause to police officers in false arrest and false im-
prisonment cases applied as well in § 1983 actions), the Court was unclear as to whether it
was establishing a good faith immunity or a good faith defense. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 176-77
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent also added to the confusion
of the good faith defense and qualified immunity because, in his view, the showing required
by a private party to establish the good faith defense is practically indistinguishable from that
required of a public official to establish qualified immunity. See id. at 178 ("Thus, respon-
dents can successfully defend this suit simply by establishing that their reliance on the
replevin statute was objectively reasonable for someone with their knowledge of the cir-
cumstances. But this is precisely the showing that entitles a public official to immunity.").
But see id. at 178 n.2 (acknowledging that there exists some subtle difference between the
common law good faith defense and qualified immunity).
" See generally Duncan, 844 F.2d 1261 (good faith defense); see also Wyatt, 504 U.S.
at 170 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (qualified immunity).
'0 Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 170 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
8, Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412 (1997).
82 See id. at 413-14; see also DelFiandra, supra note 43, at 614-15 (recognizing the
significance of the currently open possibility that private prison guards, as § 1983 defendants,
may be able to assert a good faith defense).
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1. Cases Mentioning but Not Ruling on the Good Faith Defense
While some similarities exist in the way courts have handled the good faith
defense in § 1983 actions since Richardson, there have also been differences. A few
courts have followed the pattern of Wyatt and Richardson in that they have been
careful not to decide the good faith defense question where it had not been raised by
the defendant. In Jensen v. Lane County,83 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit conducted a full qualified immunity analysis in a § 1983 action for unlawful
arrest and restraint against a private doctor who had signed a commitment order to
admit the plaintiff into a county psychiatric hospital." Relying on Richardson, the
Jensen court concluded that the private doctor, who was associated with an orga-
nization of psychiatrists that regularly worked on a contract basis with the
government, was not entitled to qualified immunity from § 1983 liability. 5 After
its extensive qualified immunity analysis, the Jensen court opted not to directly
address the defendant's prospects for success on a good faith defense, but instead
attached a footnote explicitly indicating that it made no ruling with regard to a
possible defense of good faith.86
Similarly, in Ace Beverage Co. v. Lockheed Information Management Services, 87
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit once again addressed the qualified
immunity issue and declined to make any judgment with regard to a good faith
defense.88 In Ace Beverage, the § 1983 defendant was "a private corporation that
processes parking tickets for the City of Los Angeles."89 The court determined that
the defendant was properly classified among the category of defendants covered by
the Richardson opinion, and denied qualified immunity.' At the conclusion of its
opinion, the court mentioned, almost as an aside, that like the Supreme Court in
Wyatt and Richardson, it made no ruling on the issue of a good faith defense.9
The Ninth Circuit's brief treatment of the good faith defense in Jensen and Ace
Beverage is significant. In both cases, the issue before the court appeared to be a
narrow one: is this private defendant entitled to qualified immunity? 92 The question
of a good faith defense is obviously a closely related issue but is not necessarily
implicated by the qualified immunity analysis. Perhaps the court's choice to include
83 222 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2000).
8 See id. at 572-73.
85 Id. at 579.
86 Id. at 580 n.5.
87 144 F.3d 1218 (9th Cir. 1998).
88 See id.
89 Id. at 1219.
90 Id. at 1219-20.
91 Id. at 1220.
92 See Jensen, 222 F.3d at 572; Ace Beverage, 144 F.3d at 1219.
1047
2005]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
a brief reference to the good faith defense reflects an affirmative effort to preserve
this issue for the trial court. The inclusion of the good faith defense reference may
also indicate a signal or reminder to the defendant who was denied qualified
immunity or to the trial court that good faith is a defense that ought to be addressed.
2. Cases Deciding the Proper Stage in the Litigation Process to Resolve the Good
Faith Question
Other cases since Richardson have given the good faith defense question more
substantial treatment. Considering some of these cases, one commentator noted:
A good faith defense will require that the plaintiff show that the
defendant had a subjective appreciation that his or her acts de-
prived the plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights. Since this
requires a factual inquiry, the defendant cannot have the case
dismissed as quickly as someone who is entitled to qualified
immunity.93
This case law reveals that in some situations an evaluation of the good faith defense
may require a greater degree of fact finding than others.
Courts have been conflicted as to when during the litigation process it should
rule on the good faith defense. In Wolfe v. Horn,94 for example, the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the defendant's motion for
summary judgment based on a good faith defense. 95 In Wolfe, a male to female pre-
operative transsexual inmate in Pennsylvania's state correctional system brought a
§ 1983 action against medical personnel who treated her while she was incar-
cerated.96 These medical personnel refused to prescribe hormones for the plaintiff
and failed to provide other forms of therapy she desired to aid in her struggle with
her transsexuality and related psychological ailments.97 The court first rejected any
claim of the private medical defendants to the protection of qualified immunity.98
The court then concluded that, "assuming the 'good-faith' defense applies in this
context, the defendants' subjective state of mind cannot be evaluated without
weighing the evidence and determining credibility." 99 The court, thus, denied the
defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of their good faith
" Sheila M. Lombardi, Note, Media in the Spotlight: Private Parties Liable for Violating
the Fourth Amendment, 6 ROGER WILLAMS U. L. REV. 393, 412-13 (2000).
4 130 F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
9 Id. at 659.
96 Id. at 650-51.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 656 (citing Richardson and supporting decisions from lower courts).
9 Id. at 659.
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defense."O
In Egervary v. Rooney,'(" the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania denied a plaintiff s motion for summary judgment because the defen-
dants raised, and had the potential to prevail on, a good faith defense at trial. 2 In
Egervary, private attorneys petitioned a federal district court for return of a child
who had allegedly been abducted from his mother who lived in Hungary." 3 The
attorneys' petition was granted following an ex parte hearing about which the
child's father had been given no notice or opportunity to participate.' 4 The father
sued the attorneys, claiming that they had violated his Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights. The defendants argued that they were entitled to a good faith de-
fense,'0 5 and the plaintiff moved for summary judgment.
The court briefly discussed that some confusion existed as to the exact standard
to be applied to the good faith defense, but nonetheless concluded that regardless of
the standard applied, the good faith question, in this case, was one that should be
resolved by a jury.'1 6 The court noted that a determination of good faith was not
possible until further discovery had been conducted. 7 Finally, it concluded that,
"1) defendants will be entitled to assert a good faith defense at trial; and 2) the
question of whether that defense fails as a matter of law is best determined at that
time."'08
As yet another example of courts attempting to determine the proper point at
which to rule on the good faith defense, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland included a brief discussion of this matter in Sallie v. Tax Sale Investors,
Inc.1 9 In Sallie, the plaintiffs were evicted from their rented home after their
landlord defaulted on property tax."' The plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action against
the Director of Finance for the City of Baltimore and the Sheriff of Baltimore to
challenge the constitutionality of the statutory scheme pursuant to which the tax sale
100 Id.
'0' Egervary v. Rooney, No. 96-3039, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11654 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15,
2000), affd sub nom., Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.
Ct. 868 (2005). Because this case involved private defendants acting in conjunction with
federal, rather than state, agents, it was brought as a Bivens action rather than as a § 1983
action. See id. at *2. This distinction does not appear to have affected the court's analysis of
the good faith defense. See id. at *20-22.
'02 See id. at *20-22.
'0' Id. at* 1-3.
'04 Id. at *2-3.
'05 id. at *20.
106 Id. at *20-21 (discussing the possible standards for the good faith defense listed in
Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994)).
'07 Id. at *21-22.
'0s Id. at *22.
"9 998 F. Supp. 612 (D. Md. 1998).
o ld. at 613.
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of the home had been conducted, and against the private corporation that purchased
it and evicted the plaintiffs."' In addressing the availability of the good faith de-
fense to the private corporation, the court refused to decide the matter before the
plaintiffs had some opportunity for discovery." 2 The language employed by the
court, however, appears to indicate that under a different factual scenario the court
might be inclined to enter summary judgment in favor of private § 1983 defendants
prior to discovery. 13
Well before the Richardson decision, in his dissenting opinion in Wyatt, Chief
Justice Rehnquist described some of the similarities that exist between qualified
immunity and the way a good faith defense could be applied." 4 One such similarity,
Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, was that courts would be able to dispose of some
cases at the earliest phases of litigation, regardless of whether their defense was
premised on qualified immunity or on a good faith defense."' The Chief Justice
explained:
Nor do I see any reason that this "defense" may not be
asserted early in the proceedings on a motion for summary judg-
ment, just as a claim to qualified immunity may be. Provided
that the historical facts are not in dispute, the presence or
absence of "probable cause" has long been acknowledged to be
a question of law. And so I see no reason that the trial judge may
not resolve a summary judgment motion premised on such a
good-faith defense, just as we have encouraged trial judges to do
with respect to qualified immunity claims. Thus, private defen-
dants who have invoked a state attachment law are put in the
same position whether we recognize that they are entitled to
qualified immunity or if we instead recognize a good-faith
defense." 6
111 Id.
12 Id. at 621-22. The court also noted the private defendant's confused expression of this
defense in its brief where the court described the defendant's claim that "it is entitled to a
,qualified, good faith immunity' defense." Id. at 621 (quoting Tax Sale Investor, Inc.'s
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Sallie (No. 97-2922)).
"' See id. at 621-22. The court concluded that, "[als to the good faith defense, it is
manifest that the defendant has failed to offer a basis at this stage of the case upon which it
might be concluded as a matter of law that it is entitled to the affirmative defense of good
faith." Id. This language could be interpreted to indicate that had the defendant produced
sufficient evidence that it had, in fact, acted in good faith, dismissal of the action prior to
extensive discovery might be appropriate.
"' Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 176-79 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
i15 Id. at 178-79.
l16 Id. (citations omitted). The Chief Justice further anticipated the divergence among
courts with regard to treatment of this defense: "Perhaps the Court believes that the 'defense'
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3. Resolving Who Will Have the Burden
Another point of contention among courts ruling on a good faith defense for
private § 1983 defendants is determining where to place the evidentiary burdens." 7
Resolution of this particular issue could have a significant impact on the future of
the good faith defense. If the burden remains with the plaintiff, dismissal of cases
at summary judgment will be much more likely for private § 1983 defendants. On
the other hand, if defendants are required to carry the burden of proving their
subjective good faith, this defense becomes considerably less powerful.
Before Richardson, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held un-
equivocally in Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel"8 that regardless of
the specific standard to be applied in a good faith defense inquiry, the burden
belonged to the plaintiff." 9 Similarly, in Pinsky v. Duncan,12 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit placed the burden squarely on the plaintiff.'12 One
court discussing Pinsky noted that "[tlhe court held that to prevail against the private
will be less amenable to summary disposition than will the 'immunity'; perhaps it believes
the defense will be an issue that must be submitted to the jury." Id. at 179.
In a district court case decided after Wyatt, the court echoed Chief Justice Rehnquist's
proposition that the good faith defense for private § 1983 defendants is in many ways com-
parable to qualified immunity, but drew attention to the idea that more discovery would be
necessary in the context of a good faith defense than with qualified immunity:
A good faith defense fully protects defendants who act in good faith
and thus provides them with protections similar to qualified immunity.
A good faith defense is also helpful to plaintiffs, however, because it
allows them to conduct discovery of the subjective intent of the private
defendant. Moreover, even if an "objective" private person in the
defendant's position would not have known that the conduct was un-
constitutional, the plaintiff still prevails if the defendant subjectively
knew his conduct was unconstitutional.
Franklin v. Fox, No. 97-2443, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19651, at *13-14 (N.D. Ca. Dec. 22,
2000).
"7 Compare, e.g., Robinson v. City of San Bernardino Police Dep't, 992 F. Supp. 1198
(C.D. Ca. 1998), discussed infra notes 123-30 and accompanying text, with Franklin, 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19651, discussed infra notes 131-46 and accompanying text.
118 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994).
"9 Id. at 1277-78. The court stated:
Therefore, we suggest that the district court should take care not to in-
correctly place the burden of proving the defendants' mens rea on the
defendants. We think the need to produce evidence and prove that [the
defendants] acted at least recklessly or with gross indifference to [the
plaintiff's] rights always remains on [the plaintiff].
Id. at 1278.
120 79 F.3d 306 (2d Cir. 1996).
121 Id. at 312.
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defendant the plaintiff must prove want of probable cause, malice and damages."' 2
Placement of the burden on the plaintiff continued after Richardson.
Robinson v. City of San Bernardino Police Department 2 serves as an excellent
post-Richardson example of a court placing the burden in a good faith defense
analysis on the plaintiff under a factual scenario analogous to that presented to the
Court in Richardson. In Robinson, under the direction of the San Bernardino Police
Department, a private nurse performed a "sex kit" examination on an inmate sus-
pected of rape.'24 To allow the nurse to conduct the examination, the co-defendant
city employees held the plaintiffs arms and legs.125 During the examination, the
plaintiff sustained injuries where his legs had been squeezed that included severe
pain, swelling, bruising, blood clotting and permanent disfiguration of the skin. 26
Following this incident, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 action against the private nurse,
along with other defendants, claiming the means by which "sex kit" examination
had been performed violated his Fourth, Eighth and Thirteenth Amendment rights
and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.'27
The private nurse moved for summary judgment based on her good faith
reliance on the direction of the San Bernardino police officers who ordered the
examination. 28 The court observed that the nurse established that she acted in good
faith and that she believed the police officers directing the search had either
probable cause or a search warrant.129 Nonetheless, the court explained clearly that
summary judgment was appropriate because the plaintiff had not met his burden of
producing evidence that the private defendant did not act in good faith.'30
Courts in other cases have taken exactly the opposite approach, placing the
burden of demonstrating that the defendant did in fact act in good faith on the
defendant. Perhaps the clearest example of a case in which the defendant was left
with the burden is in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California's
opinion in Franklin v. Fox.'3' In Franklin, the district court discussed several cases
in which the burden of disproving the good faith defense rested with the plaintiff;
nevertheless, the court placed the burden on the defendant. 132
122 Franklin, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19651, at *12 (citation omitted).
123 992 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. Ca. 1998).
124 Id. at 1203. A "sex kit" examination is a process by which a nurse collects evidence
from rape suspects. Id. at 1202.
'25 Id. at 1201.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1202.
129 id. at 1207.
130 Id. ("Since the plaintiff has not submitted any evidence from which it may be inferred
that she acted in bad faith, defendant [private nurse] is entitled to summary judgment in her
favor.").
'3' Franklin v. Fox, No. 97-2443,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19651 (N.D. Ca. Dec. 22, 2000).
132 See id. at *9-21.
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Franklin involved a plaintiff who had been convicted of murdering a chil....
was subsequently exonerated.'33 After his arrest, the plaintiffs daughter obtained
information as to how to arrange a visit with her father from an official, presumably
the prosecutor, involved in her father's case.'34 The official knew that the daughter's
purpose in visiting her father was to encourage him to plead guilty to the murder.' 35
The plaintiff then brought a § 1983 action against his daughter for conspiring to
violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because she had discussed her visit
with officials involved in her father's prosecution when arranging her visit.
3 6
In addressing the question of applying the good faith defense to the private
defendant, the district court first determined that private § 1983 defendants are
entitled to assert a good faith defense. 37 The court then postulated as to "what must
be proven with respect to the defendant's good faith or lack thereof, and who has the
burden of proof."' 3 8 The Franklin court noted that the standards previous courts had
applied to good faith defense claims were derived from examining the most closely
related common law tort claims. "
Although in such cases the burden had fallen on the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant's conduct did not amount to good faith, the district court suggested that
the burden might not belong to the plaintiff in all cases.'o To support this pro-
position, the court referred to the language employed by the Supreme Court in
Richardson. 14' That court noted that: "In Richardson, for example, majority opinion
specifically left unanswered the question of whether the guards have an affirnative
defense of good faith, or whether a plaintiff might have additional burdens."'42
Unlike prior good faith defense cases, the Sixth Amendment violation claimed in
Franklin was not closely analogous to the torts of malicious prosecution or abuse
of process; therefore, the court found it more difficult to determine who bore the
burden of proof.'43
The district court found that the defendant, under the facts presented, would
133 Id. at *1-2.
134 Id. at *18-19.
135 id.
136 Id. at *3.
117 Id. at *13-14.
131 Id. at *14.
139 Id. at * 14-16. In a number of these cases, the Court found that "the most analogous
common law torts to the section 1983 claims" involved "malicious prosecution and abuse of
process." See id at *15.
140 Id. at *16.
141 id.
142 Id. (citing Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413 (1997)). Presumably, the
inference here is that if good faith is an affirmative defense, the defendant would bear the
burden of showing good faith.
143 Id.
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prevail on a good faith defense regardless of which party had the burden of proof.1"
Consequently, the court treated the burden as though it belonged to the defendant.'45
The court then applied a more stringent standard than most other good faith defense
cases, holding that the defendant "bears the burden of proving that she did not know,
and should not have known, that her jailhouse visit with her father violated plain-
tiff's Sixth Amendment right to counsel."' 46
In Sallie v. Tax Sale Investors, Inc. , the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland was ambiguous as to which party held the burden of proof with regard to
the good faith defense. In denying the private defendant's motion to dismiss, or in
the alternative, for summary judgment, the district court noted that the defendant
had failed "to offer a basis at this stage of the case upon which it might be concluded
as a matter of law that it is entitled to the affirmative defense of good faith. ' ' 4 The
court found that it was unable to determine "whether a viable claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983" was presented. 49 The court continued, however, to explain that the plain-
tiffs were entitled to discovery relating to the good faith defense. 5 ° These two
remarks, taken together, beg resolution of who actually has the burden in the context
of a good faith defense.
4. Determining the Nature of the Standard
The Franklin decision is significant for another reason as well: it added an
objective component to the good faith defense standard.' 5' In most cases, the
standard has been presumed to be purely subjective.12 In Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild,
O'Brien & Frankel,153 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit quoted
language from the Fifth Circuit's opinion in the remand of Wyatt that included both
a subjective and objective component of the good faith defense, 54 yet determined
'44 Id. at "16-17.
145 Id. at *16-18.
" Id. at * 17 (applying a standard that not only places the burden on the defendant, but
also requires both a subjective and an objective inquiry).
'47 998 F. Supp. 612 (D. Md. 1998). See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text for
a summary of the facts and disposition in Sallie.
141 Id. at 621-22.
149 Id. at 625.
150 Id. at 621-22.
' See Franklin, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19651, at *17-18.
.52 See, e.g., Lombardi, supra note 93, at 412 ("It is clear from the following that a good
faith defense is different from qualified immunity.... A good faith defense will require that
the plaintiff show that the defendant had a subjective appreciation that his or her acts de-
prived the plaintiff of his or her constitutional rights.").
1' 20 F.3d 1250 (3d Cir. 1994).
"s Id. at 1276 (quoting Wyatt v. Cole, 994 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir. 1993), on remand
from 504 U.S. 158 (1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 977 (1993)). The remand decision of Wyatt
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that good faith for private section 1983 defendants "depends on their subjective .
of mind, rather than the more demanding objective standard of reasonable belief that
governs qualified immunity."'
55
Despite the tendency of courts to view the good faith defense as a subjective
defense, nothing in the language of either Wyatt or Richardson indicates that the
possible defense would be a subjective inquiry. 5 6 The Supreme Court, in those
cases, has left open for interpretation whether the good faith defense would be based
on a subjective inquiry, an objective inquiry, or a showing of both subjective and
objective good faith.'" This possibility helps explain Chief Justice Rehnquist's
discussion of the blending of the objective and subjective inquiries found in his
dissenting opinion in Wyatt. 8
In light of the fact that the Supreme Court has left room for the good faith
defense to be molded, Justice Kennedy's discussion of the evolution of qualified
immunity in his concurring opinion in Wyatt could potentially foreshadow this evo-
lution of the good faith defense.'59 Just as lower courts have looked to the common
law for guidance to define the good faith defense, Justice Kennedy noted that "[t]he
good-faith and probable-cause defense evolved into our modem qualified-immunity
doctrine. ' ' "W Justice Kennedy acknowledged that qualified immunity had its origin
used emphatic language to declare that the Supreme Court's standard for the good faith
defense contains both an objective and a subjective component: "all of the Justices agreed
that plaintiffs seeking to recover on these theories were required to prove that defendants
acted with malice and without probable cause." Wyatt, 994 F.2d at 1119. In addition, the
Fifth Circuit declared that private § 1983 defendants would only be liable for damages if they
"failed to act in good faith in invoking the unconstitutional state procedures, that is, if they
either knew or should have known that the statute upon which they relied was unconsti-
tutional." Id. at 1118 (emphasis added). This either/or explanation of the cause of action
suggests that a good faith defense could be successful by an objective or by a subjective
showing of good faith. See id. It should be noted, however, that the Wyatt remand decision
was also careful to declare that the burden of affirmatively showing malice and probable
cause belongs to the plaintiff. Id. at 1119.
155 Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1277. A Pennsylvania district court, relying on Jordan, also
concluded good faith applied in cases where the defendant acted with subjective good faith.
See Egervary v. Rooney, No. 96-3039, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11654, at *20-21 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 15, 2000), affd sub nom., Egervary v. Young, 366 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 2004), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 868 (2005).
156 See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 169 (1992) ("[W]e do not foreclose the possibility
that private defendants faced with § 1983 liability ... could be entitled to an affirmative
defense based on goodfaith and/orprobable cause.") (emphasis added); see also Richardson
v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 413 (1997) (quoting Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169).
7 See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169; Richardson, 521 U.S. at 413.
158 See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 176-78 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also supra notes 71,
78 and accompanying text.
9 See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 170-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
160 Id. at 170 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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in the common law, but discussed its sharp departure from this original formu-
lation. 6 '
111. RECOMMENDATIONS
Considering the various approaches courts have taken to define the good faith
defense, what is needed is a Supreme Court decision defining the parameters of the
good faith defense and providing lower courts with direction as to how to adjudicate
cases in which this defense arises. This Part discusses possibilities and makes re-
commendations relating to some of the questions presented in Part 11. Specifically,
what contours of the good faith defense will best serve the purposes of the defense,
and what implications would formal recognition and concrete definition of this
defense have on § 1983 litigation?
A. Possible Contours of the Good Faith Defense
Each time the Supreme Court has mentioned the good faith defense in the
context of § 1983 litigation, it has passed on the issue, declaring it not properly
before the Court. 62 Before the contours of the good faith defense can be defined,
a formal recognition by the Court is needed to establish that such a defense does in
fact exist and is available to private defendants to § 1983 actions. Once this princi-
ple is affirmatively established, the Court can decide the specific reach and function
of this defense.
Determining the precise contours of the good faith defense will be a more
challenging question. Perhaps a solid definition for this defense will not be possible
from a single ruling, but rather will need to be developed by the Court over time.
As noted above, the modem qualified immunity standard, the most closely related
concept for public officials defending against § 1983 actions, has changed and
developed over a series of cases.'63
This development of the qualified immunity standard may be a source to help
sculpt a cogent good faith defense standard for private § 1983 defendants. Before
the Court decided Harlow v. Fitzgerald,164 its previous standard had included both
161 Id. Justice Kennedy observed that, "[in the context of qualified immunity for public
officials, however, we have diverged to a substantial degree from the historical standards."
Id. To support this proposition, Justice Kennedy quoted language from Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,645 (1987), that described the significance of Harlow v. Fizgerald,
457 U.S. 800 (1982), in redefining the qualified immunity standard. Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 170
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
162 See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 169; Richardson, 521 U.S. at 413-14; see also supra notes 42,
57 and accompanying text.
163 See supra Part I.B.
'64 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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an objective and a subjective component. 165 This standard was later transform ,..
include only an objective analysis.'66 The defense of good faith has traditionally
been a subjective standard. 167 Because a subjective analysis is a fact-based inquiry,
courts have been slow to dismiss § 1983 actions on the basis of this defense early
in the litigation process.168 This, however, does not need to be the case.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Wyatt offered a description of
how the good faith defense might work by incorporating both subjective and ob-
jective components. 69 Rehnquist's objective analysis asked whether the defendant
had probable cause to bring a replevin action in the prior litigation; 70 and his sub-
jective analysis asked whether the defendant acted without malice in instituting the
underlying replevin action. 7' Transferring this analysis to the prison context, an
objective inquiry might involve determining whether an official reasonably would
have known that his action violated the plaintiff's clearly established constitutional
rights;'72 and a subjective analysis might inquire as to whether the official in
question actually knew his conduct had violated an inmate's constitutional rights.
With regard to a public prison official, a qualified immunity analysis asks only
the objective question of whether the official violated a clearly established consti-
tutional right of which the official reasonably should have known.'73 A good faith
defense inquiry for a private prison official might similarly rely on an objective
analysis, but blend a subjective component into the legal framework. This could
function as a burden-shifting approach.
B. Burden Shifting
A private § 1983 defendant wishing to raise a good faith defense might carry the
initial burden of proving his actions objectively not to be in violation of clearly
established constitutional rights of which the official should have known. If the
defendant can meet this burden of proof, the burden could then shift to the plaintiff
to put forth evidence that the defendant subjectively knew that his actions violated
the plaintiff s constitutional rights. Under such a scheme, trial courts would be able
165 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
167 See Duncan v. Peck, 844 F.2d 1261, 1266 (6th Cir. 1988) ("In short, good faith im-
munity is based on an objective analysis, while a good faith defense includes subjective
factors.").
168 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
169 See supra notes 71, 78 and accompanying text.
170 See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 178 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
"'. See id. at 177.
172 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (announcing the modem qualified
immunity standard in terms of an objective question).
173 Id.
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to tailor discovery to allow plaintiffs the opportunity to seek evidence that private
officials, subject to § 1983, acted in bad faith in engaging in conduct that violated
the plaintiff's constitutional rights. At the same time, however, if the plaintiff is
unable to put forth evidence of bad faith, the action could be dismissed at the sum-
mary judgment phase.
This structure would both serve the purposes of § 1983 as a tool for avenging
constitutional violations, and would provide private § 1983 defendants with greater
protections than are currently available to them under the law. Such a system would
also promote the values of judicial efficiency. Once the defendant has shown
objective good faith, the trial judge could limit discovery to prevent overburdening
the defense, while still providing the plaintiff with the opportunity to find and
present evidence of bad faith.
C. Interlocutory Appeal
Another characteristic of qualified immunity that might be considered when
assessing the contours of the good faith defense is the availability of interlocutory
appeal. The Wyatt Court highlighted the party's ability to immediately appeal
denials of qualified immunity as one of the important characteristics of the
doctrine. 4 Qualified immunity provides more than a shield to liability, but also an
immunity from having to stand trial.Y 5 As the Wyatt Court pointed out, where
qualified immunity is denied in error, the immunity-from-suit aspect of the doctrine
is lost.'76
It is important to recognize, however, the distinction between qualified immu-
nity and any proposal for how a good faith defense may be crafted. Although a
good faith defense may allow for § 1983 actions to be dismissed during the early
stages of the litigation process,'77 the good faith defense is still a defense, not an
immunity from suit. The Wyatt opinion carefully noted that because of this distinc-
tion, regardless of any similarity between qualified immunity and the good faith
defense, interlocutory appeal could not be available to private § 1983 defendants
asserting the defense.'78 Following such a clear expression from the Supreme Court
on this matter, it is clear that a negative court ruling on the issue of the good faith
defense cannot be immediately appealed.
174 See Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 166 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)).
7 See id.
176 id.
171 See supra Part II.A-B.
171 Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 166-67 & n.2;accordJordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel,
20 F.3d 1250, 1277 n.33 (3d Cii. 1994) ("The policies that permit a government actor who
is denied summary judgment on a qualified immunity defense an immediate right to appeal
do not clearly apply to a private person's claim of good faith.").
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IV. IMPLICATIONS
This Note has considered the good faith defense within the context of the
privatization of state prisons because of the relationship of this concern to the facts
facing the Supreme Court in Richardson v. McKnight,'79 and because of the signi-
ficance of the trend of states toward privatizing corrections. 8 ' The question of the
availability of the good faith defense for private-party § 1983 defendants, however,
extends beyond the private prison context. The work of a number of traditional
government services are routinely contracted to private organizations at all levels
of government.' Some such functions are auxiliary to correctional services, such
as drug and alcohol treatment programs, while others are services provided to other
sectors of the population or to the public more generally, such as emergency medical
services, ambulance service and programs for the elderly. 8 '
The Richardson Court recognized that resolution of issues relating to private
prisons could implicate other realms of government privatization as well.'83 Specif-
ically, the Court listed as examples electricity production, waste disposal, and mail
delivery.'84 Section 1983 litigation could easily arise in relation to any of these areas
of public-private cooperation to provide public services. Given the potentially far-
reaching implications of this matter, resolution of the good faith defense question
becomes even more significant.
CONCLUSION
The privatization of government services, particularly state corrections, is a
trend that is ever-increasing in significance. As states rely to a greater degree on
private sector cooperation and private sector contracting to provide public services,
the resolution of legal questions relating to § 1983 liability for private-party defen-
dants becomes ever more important. In both the Wyatt and Richardson decisions,
of 1992 and 1997 respectively, the Supreme Court denied private actors qualified
immunity when confronted with § 1983 liability, but, in both cases, the Court also
conceded that private defendants might have a defense of good faith available to
79 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
,So See supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text.
, See, e.g., Correctional Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001) (recognizing the
privatization of federal prisons); Richardson, 521 U.S. 399 (reviewing an action deriving
from the privatization of state prisons). In an article published in the Vanderbilt Law Review,
E.S. Savas enumerated some of these regularly privatized functions. E.S. Savas, Privatization
and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 889, 890-93 (1987) (discussing the privatization of prisons
and other government functions at the local level).
182 See Savas, supra note 181, at 890-91.
183 See Richardson, 521 U.S. at 408-09.
4 Id. at 409.
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them. "'85 What is needed from the Court is a formal recognition of the good faith
defense available to private-party § 1983 defendants, and a definition as to the exact
contours, burdens and proper resolution of cases in which defendants raise this
defense.
'8 See supra notes 11-12, 40-57 and accompanying text.
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